Stochastic programming and distributionally robust optimization seek deterministic decisions that optimize a risk measure, possibly in view of the most adverse distribution in an ambiguity set. We investigate under which circumstances such deterministic decisions are strictly outperformed by random decisions which depend on a randomization device producing uniformly distributed samples that are independent of all uncertain factors affecting the decision problem. We find that in the absence of distributional ambiguity, deterministic decisions are optimal if both the risk measure and the feasible region are convex, or alternatively if the risk measure is mixture-quasiconcave. We show that several classes of risk measures, such as mean (semi-)deviation and mean (semi-)moment measures, fail to be mixture-quasiconcave and can therefore give rise to problems in which the decision maker benefits from randomization. Under distributional ambiguity, on the other hand, we show that for any ambiguity averse risk measure there always exists a decision problem (with a nonconvex-e.g., mixed-integer-feasible region) in which a randomized decision strictly dominates all deterministic decisions.
Introduction
Would you choose your life partner by spinning the fortune wheel? Would you decide on a company merger by tossing a coin? Replacing sound reasoning with the flip of a coin appears to violate the very fundamentals of rational decision-making, namely that actions should be assessed in view of their desirability towards a goal, and that eliminating uncertainty is always desirable. Nevertheless, random decision-taking, or flipism, 1 has a long history. The Kantu' farmers in Borneo selected their farming sites through a ritualized form of birdwatching, the Naskapi hunters in Canada chose their hunting sites by reading the cracks on the scapula of a caribou, and the Azande people of central Africa took difficult decisions by poisoning a chicken and seeing whether it survived. 2 Public officials in ancient Athens were frequently chosen by lottery, and the nobles of Renaissance Venice selected their head of state through a partially randomized process so that no group could impose its will without an overwhelming majority or exceptional luck. More recently, British Columbia and Ontario have used randomly selected panels of Canadian citizens to propose changes in electoral regulations, and the International Skating Union adopted a random voting system in figure-skating competitions. Many more examples of randomized decision-making in politics, military and society have been compiled in [46] . We conclude that randomization-either in its explicit form or disguised as a divine dispensation-has survived and thrived as a quick, cheap and fair decision aid that avoids unintentional biases and deliberate interferences in the decision-making process.
In this paper we explore whether randomization can help a rational decision maker who has all the resources to determine an optimal solution, and who is not subjected to the strategic reactions of other agents. To this end, we assume that the decision maker has access to a randomization device which produces a uniformly distributed sample from the interval [0, 1] that is independent of all uncertain factors impacting the decision problem, and we investigate under which circumstances the decision maker can benefit from taking decisions that depend on the outcome of this randomization device. We illustrate this seemingly counterintuitive idea with an example.
Example 1 (Project Selection). A manager must implement one out of five candidate projects. 1 Flipism refers to a pseudophilosophy under which all decisions are made by flipping a coin. The name originates from the Disney comic "Flip Decision" (Walt Disney Comics & Stories 149, Vol. 13, No. 5, 1953) . 2 After visiting the Azande in the 1920s, the British anthropologist E. E. Evans-Pritchard adopted this custom and concluded: "I found this as satisfactory a way of running my home and affairs as any other I know of". The projects' net present values (NPVs) follow independent Bernoulli distributions that assign equal probabilities p L i = p H i = 0.5 to the low and high NPV scenarios from Table 1 . The scenarios are chosen such that projects with higher indices display a higher expected NPV as well as a higher dispersion, as indicated by the increasing spread between the associated two NPV scenarios.
If the manager aims to maximize the expected NPV, then she selects project 5. The manager cannot improve upon this pure (i.e., deterministic) choice by making a random choice as long as the NPVs are independent of the randomization device. If the manager is risk-averse and uses the mean semi-variance ρ(X) = −E[X] + E[E[X] − X] 2 + to measure the risk of an uncertain position X, on the other hand, then the best pure choice is to select project 3 (with risk 0.0500), followed by projects 2 and 4 (each with risk 0.0750). Interestingly, the manager could almost half her risk exposure to 0.0299 by randomly selecting one of the individually suboptimal projects 2 and 4 with equal probability. In fact, the globally optimal strategy randomizes over the two individually least favorable projects 1 and 5 with probabilities 63% and 37%, respectively, which yields a mean semivariance of −0.0540. Thus, the best randomized strategy offers an acceptable (negative) risk even though all pure strategies lead to unacceptable (positive) risks.
The example highlights that the potential benefits of randomization are, at least in part, determined by the choice of risk measure. In the remainder of the paper, we will call a risk measure randomization-receptive if a decision maker employing the risk measure can benefit from randomization, and we call the risk measure randomization-proof otherwise. We will see that randomizationreceptiveness is intimately related to the mixture-quasiconcavity of the considered risk measure.
Traditionally, decision theory assumes that the probability distribution governing the stochas-tic problem parameters is known precisely. This often contradicts managerial practice, where this distribution can neither be deduced from theoretical models nor be approximated to a satisfactory degree from historical obserations. For such settings, the distributionally robust optimization literature suggests to construct an ambiguity set that contains all plausible distributions, and to optimize a risk measure in view of the worst (i.e., most adverse) distribution from within the ambiguity set [14, 49] . This approach enjoys strong justification from decision theory, where it has been argued that decision makers exhibit a low tolerance towards distributional ambiguity [18, 21] .
In such cases, randomization can reduce, and sometimes even eliminate, the effects of ambiguity.
Example 2 (The Ellsberg Urn Game). Consider an urn that contains an unknown number of red and blue balls in equal proportion. A player is asked to name one of the two colors and to draw a random ball from the urn. If the chosen ball has the stated color, the player incurs a penalty of $1; otherwise, the player is rewarded $1. One readily verifies that the player receives an expected reward of $0 under either choice ('red' or 'blue').
Assume now that the same game is played with an urn that contains red and blue balls, but neither the number of balls nor the proportions of their colors are known. Since the distribution of colors is completely ambiguous, the worst scenario is that all balls in the urn have the color named by the player, in which case the penalty of $1 arises with certainty. Thus, a maximally ambiguityaverse player is indifferent between any pure strategy (i.e., naming red or blue) and paying a fixed amount of $1. Assume instead that the player randomly names 'red' (or 'blue') with probability p (or 1 − p), and that the (unknown) probability of the drawn ball being red (blue) is q (or 1 − q). In that case, an ambiguity-averse player would be confronted with the following optimization problem.
The inner minimization problem has the parametric optimal solution q = 1 if p > 1/2; q ∈ [0, 1] if p = 1/2; q = 0 if p < 1/2, which results in an objective value of −2|p − 1/2|. Under the optimal choice p = 1/2 (i.e., picking a color based on the throw of a fair coin), the player can completely suppress the ambiguity and receive the same expected reward of $0 as in the first urn game where the proportions of colors are known.
We will show that under distributional ambiguity, every risk measure satisfying a mild regularity condition is randomization-receptive. We illustrate this with our earlier project selection example.
Example 3 (Project Selection cont'd).
We again consider the project selection problem from Example 1. Assume now that the probabilities p L i and p H i corresponding to the low and high NPV scenarios of the i-th project, respectively, are ambiguous, and that they are only known to satisfy (1) . In this case, the optimal pure strategy selects project 5, resulting in a worst-case expected value of 0.2168, whereas the optimal randomized strategy chooses projects 1, 2, 3 and 4 with probabilities 57%, 22%, 13% and 8%, respectively, yielding a more than twice as large worst-case expected value of 0.5547.
In this paper, we take a first step towards exploring the implications of randomization in decision problems affected by risk (stochastic programming) and ambiguity (distributionally robust optimization). More specifically, the contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1. We show that in the absence of distributional ambiguity, there is no benefit in randomization when (i) both the risk measure and the set of feasible decisions are convex, or if (ii) the risk measure is mixture-quasiconcave, irrespective of the structure of the feasible set.
2. We show that although many risk measures are mixture-quasiconcave and thus randomizationproof, several popular classes of risk measures, such as mean (semi-)deviation and mean (semi-)moment measures, are in fact randomization-receptive.
3.
We develop a formal model for decision-making under risk and ambiguity, and we introduce the notions of law invariant, ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-monotone risk measures in decision problems under distributional ambiguity. 4 . We show that for any ambiguity averse risk measure there exists a decision problem (with a nonconvex feasible set) in which a randomized strategy strictly dominates all pure strategies.
Our findings imply that a large number of stochastic and distributionally robust optimization problems in classical combinatorial optimization [12, 13] as well as applications in healthcare [36, 37] , energy [25, 50] , finance [27] and supply chain management [11, 23] may benefit from randomization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on randomization in decision theory and related fields. Sections 3-5 discuss randomized decisions in the absence of distributional ambiguity. After a theoretical characterization of the decision problems that can benefit from randomization in Section 3, Sections 4 and 5 delineate the classes of randomization-receptive and randomization-proof risk measures. Section 6 extends the concept of randomized decision-making to problems with distributional ambiguity. We finally discuss the question of time consistency in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
A Survey of Relevant Literature
Decision-making under risk (where the probability distribution of the outcomes is known) and ambiguity (where the probability distribution of the outcomes is itself unknown) has a long history that dates back to the early work of Keynes [28] , Knight [30] and others. Within this broad domain, our work is most closely related to the fields of stochastic programming and (distributionally) robust optimization, which model, analyze and numerically solve decision problems affected by risk and ambiguity. In these problems, risk is quantified by a suitably chosen risk measure, such as the expected value, the variance or the (conditional) value-at-risk, and ambiguity is accounted for by evaluating the risk measure over the most adverse distribution from within an ambiguity set. We refer to [6, 9, 45] for surveys of the extensive stochastic programming and distributionally robust optimization literature. We emphasize that in contrast to our paper, both literature streams have to date solely focused on the choice of pure decisions. A notable exception is the recent research on distributionally robust Markov decision processes, which has shown that randomized strategies can increase the worst-case expected reward in certain classes of dynamic decision problems where the underlying stochastic process is itself only partially known [47, 48] .
Randomized strategies have a long history in game theory. Nash has shown that a large class of non-cooperative, simultaneous-move games have an equilibrium if the players are allowed to randomize between their strategies [39] . Moreover, it has been shown that ambiguity-averse players may have additional incentives to randomize [29, 33] . More recently, it has been observed that in Stackelberg leader-follower games, the leader can benefit from randomized strategies whenever the follower is oblivious, that is, rather than observing the actually implemented decision, the follower can only observe the probabilities with which different decisions are selected. Stackelberg games with randomized decisions have numerous applications in security games, see [2, 8, 31, 35] .
Randomized decision-making has also received significant attention in the wider economic literature. On the empirical side, there is ample evidence that agents exhibit choice switching behavior when repeatedly facing instances of the same problem [15] . On the theoretical side, the economic literature on randomized decision-making can be categorized into three classes [1] : (i) random utility models, where decision makers randomize over time as their preferences evolve (see, e.g., [24] ); (ii) bounded rationality models, where agents take the best pure decision over a randomly formed consideration set (see, e.g., [34] ); and (iii) deliberate randomization models, where randomized strategies are deliberately taken as they outperform the available pure choices. Since our paper most closely aligns to the third model class, we restrict our review to these models.
Randomization-seeking preferences have been studied under different decision-theoretic frameworks [16, 17, 43] . While there seems to be a general consensus that decision makers should not benefit from ex ante randomization, where the outcome of the randomization device is observed before taking the decision, in some frameworks decision makers can benefit from ex post randomization, where they commit themselves here-and-now to a strategy that depends on the subsequently observed outcome of the randomization device [16, 42] . In these frameworks, the preference for randomized strategies is envisaged by the axioms, for example through the comonotonic independence axiom in Choquet expected utility theory [44] and the uncertainty aversion axiom in maximin expected utility theory [21] . In contrast, we focus on risk measures that are employed in finance, stochastic programming and distributionally robust optimization, and we investigate under which conditions a randomized strategy can outperform all pure choices. It is perhaps surprising that the benefits of randomization have not yet been explored in those literature streams.
Randomized decisions also play a crucial role in the design of algorithms for, among others, data manipulation, computational geometry and number theory [38] . In those fields, the performance of a deterministic algorithm is typically measured by the worst-case runtime over all instances of a fixed size. Thus, the optimal design of a deterministic algorithm can be viewed as a Stackelberg game between a leader that specifies an algorithm and a follower that selects the most adverse problem instance for the algorithm. In many cases, randomized algorithms, which employ randomness as part of their logic, offer probabilistic runtime guarantees that are competitive with those of the best deterministic algorithms, while at the same time being significantly easier to implement.
Randomization under Stochastic Uncertainty
Assume that uncertainty is modeled via a probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), where Ω 0 represents the set of outcomes, F 0 the σ-algebra of events and P 0 the probability measure. We denote by L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) the space of all real-valued random variables that are essentially bounded with respect to P 0 . We can think of each X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) as a financial position or revenue, and we denote by F X the distribution function of X under P 0 defined through F X (x) = P 0 (X ≤ x) for all
x ∈ R. Throughout the paper we will assume that the probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic.
The assumption of a non-atomic probability space is non-restrictive because any atomic probability space can be augmented to a non-atomic one by including a continuously distributed dummy random variable. Working with a non-atomic probability space implies that L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is rich enough to contain random variables with arbitrary distributions. To formalize this statement, we define D as the set of all distributions with bounded support, i.e., D comprises all nondecreasing right-continuous functions F : R → [0, 1] that attain both 0 and 1.
Proof. As (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic, there exists a standard uniformly distributed random variable U 0 ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ). Choose now an arbitrary F ∈ D and denote by F −1 the corresponding quantile function defined through F −1 (y) = inf{x : F (x) ≥ y} for all y ∈ R. By construction,
A risk measure is a functional ρ 0 : L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) → R that assigns each financial position a risk index. We will focus exclusively on law invariant risk measures, which quantify the risk of a position X solely on the basis of its distribution function F X .
it satisfies the following condition for all random variables X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Any law invariant risk measure ρ 0 on a non-atomic probability space corresponds to a real-valued functional 0 on the space D of all distribution functions with bounded support.
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of
Proof. The existence of 0 follows immediately from the law invariance of ρ 0 . As for the uniqueness, assume to the contrary that (2) is satisfied by two functionals 0 , 0 such that there is F ∈ D with 0 (F ) = 0 (F ). Lemma 1 then implies that F = F X for some X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ). We then obtain
Several commonly encountered properties of risk measures are reviewed below.
tary if it satisfies the following conditions for all random variables X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Translation invariance: If t ∈ R, then ρ 0 (X + t) = ρ 0 (X) − t.
We alert the reader that we do not implicitly assume convex risk measures to be monetary as is frequently done in the literature. The explicit distinction between convex and convex monetary risk measures will facilitate a more concise description of the main results in this paper.
is called coherent if it satisfies the following condition for all random variables X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Scale invariance: If λ ≥ 0, then ρ 0 (λX) = λρ 0 (X).
The class of coherent risk measures has been popularized in the seminal paper [3] . However, many widely-used risk measures are not scale invariant and thus fail to be coherent.
Consider now a decision maker who needs to select a financial position from a feasible set
. If the disutility of each position is quantified using a risk measure ρ 0 , then the decision maker may solve the following optimization problem in pure strategies.
(Pure Strategy Problem) minimize
Alternatively, the decision maker might optimize over a class of randomized strategies by using a randomization device that is independent of all X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ). We assume henceforth that this randomization device generates samples from the uniform distribution U on the interval [0, 1] equipped with the Borel σ-algebra B [0,1] . To formalize the optimization problem over randomized strategies, we thus introduce an augmented probability space (Ω, F, 1] and P = P 0 × U. Elements of Ω 0 will usually be denoted by ω 0 , while elements of Ω will be denoted by ω = (ω 0 , u). We further define the feasible set of randomized strategies as
Note that any randomized strategy X ∈ X can be viewed as a decision rule that assigns each possible outcome u ∈ [0, 1] of the randomization device a pure strategy X(·, u) ∈ X 0 . Moreover, the space of pure strategies X 0 can naturally be embedded into X by identifying the elements of X 0 with those elements of X that are constant in u. We will henceforth refer to such random variables as being independent of the randomization device. (ii) Uniform samples from [0, 1] d can systematically be transformed to samples from an arbitrary distribution on R d via the inverse Rosenblatt transformation [41] . Thus, if we can sample uniformly from [0, 1], then we can sample from any multivariate distribution.
In order to be able to quantify the risk of a randomized strategy, we need to extend the risk measure ρ 0 on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) to another risk measure ρ on L ∞ (Ω, F, P). This extension is unique if we insist that ρ must be law invariant and coincide with ρ 0 on the subspace of all random variables that are independent of the randomization device.
Proof. Let ρ be any law invariant risk measure that extends ρ 0 to L ∞ (Ω, F, P), and note that (Ω, F, P) is non-atomic as it is an extension of a non-atomic probability space. Proposition 1 thus ensures the existence of a mapping : D → R with ρ(X) = (F X ) for all X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P). Hence, we have (F X ) = ρ(X) = ρ 0 (X) = 0 (F X ) for all X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), where the second equality follows from the requirement that ρ must equal ρ 0 on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), while the third equality holds by the definition of 0 . Lemma 1 then implies that (F ) = 0 (F ) for all F ∈ D. Thus, ρ(X) = (F X ) = 0 (F X ) is the only law invariant risk measure that extends ρ 0 to L ∞ (Ω, F, P).
We can now formulate the counterpart of (3) that optimizes over all randomized strategies as
It is clear that the optimal value of (4) is never worse (that is, strictly larger) than the optimal value of (3). Indeed, problem (3) can be recovered from (4) by restricting X to those random variables that are independent of the randomization device. Instead, there are interesting situations where the best randomized strategy is strictly preferred to the best pure one, that is, where the optimal value of (4) is strictly smaller than the optimal value of (3), see, e.g., Example 1. A variety of popular law invariant risk measures that can benefit from randomization is presented in Section 4.
In the following we demonstrate that there is no benefit in adopting a randomized strategy when either (i) ρ 0 is convex and X 0 is a convex feasible set, or (ii) ρ 0 is mixture-quasiconcave.
To simplify the subsequent arguments, we introduce the following notational shorthand.
Remark 2. The distribution function F X of a random variable X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P) is given by
Thus, the distribution function of X corresponds to an infinite convex combination of the distribution functions associated with the random variables X(·, u) ∈ X 0 for u ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, the distribution function of the mixture X⊕ θ Y is given by the convex combination θF
We first demonstrate that under a convex risk measure the convex combination of two pure positions is always weakly preferred to the mixture of these positions when the mixture probabilities are used as convex weights.
Proof. For any s ∈ [0, 1], we define the auxiliary random variable
. Note that, for any s ∈ [0, 1], the random variable X⊕ s θ Y mixes X and Y with probabilities θ and 1 − θ, respectively. Thus, X⊕ s θ Y has the same law as X⊕ θ Y irrespective of s. By construction, integrating X⊕ s θ Y scenariowise over s ∈ [0, 1] yields the convex combination θX + (1 − θ)Y , which is independent of the randomization device. To see this, observe that
As ρ inherits convexity from ρ 0 , Jensen's inequality implies
where the second equality follows from the law invariance of ρ.
Unless Jensen's inequality in the proof of Theorem 1 is binding, the risk of the mixture X⊕ θ Y is strictly larger than the risk of the convex combination θX + (1 − θ)Y . This is the case, for instance, if X = Y , θ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ is strictly convex.
Using a similar strategy as in the proof of Theorem 1, we can further show that randomization is never beneficial if ρ 0 is convex and X 0 constitutes a convex feasible set.
Theorem 2. Assume that ρ is the unique law invariant extension of the convex law invariant risk measure ρ 0 and that X 0 is convex. Then, problems (3) and (4) attain the same optimal value.
Proof. As (3) is a restriction of (4), it suffices to show that the optimal value of (3) is never larger than that of (4). To this end, we define T s : Ω → Ω through T s (ω 0 , u) = (ω 0 , (u + s mod 1)) for all (ω 0 , u) ∈ Ω. By construction, T s is a measurable bijection. A direct calculation shows that P(T −1 s (A)) = P(A) for every A ∈ F, and thus T s is in fact a measure preserving transformation. Choose now any X ∈ X , and note that X • T s ∈ X has the same law as X. Next, define
Moreover, Y ∈ X 0 because X 0 is convex and Y can be viewed as an infinite convex combination of the random variables X(·, (u + s mod 1)) ∈ X 0 across all s ∈ [0, 1].
where the second equality follows from the law invariance of ρ. As any X ∈ X gives rise to some Y ∈ X 0 with weakly smaller risk, the optimal value of (3) is never larger than that of (4).
In the following we show that there is no benefit in randomization if the risk measure ρ 0 is mixture-quasiconcave, even if X 0 is non-convex.
Definition 7 (Mixture-Quasiconcavity). A law invariant risk measure ρ 0 is called mixture-quasiconcave if the corresponding mapping 0 , defined on the set of distribution functions, is quasiconcave, that is, if 0 satisfies the following property for all X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Theorem 3. Assume that ρ is the unique law invariant extension of a law invariant risk measure ρ 0 that is mixture-quasiconcave. Then, problems (3) and (4) attain the same optimal values.
Proof. As (3) is a restriction of (4), it suffices to show that the optimal value of (3) is never larger than that of (4). To this end, we recall that the law invariance of ρ implies that there exists a functional from the space of distribution functions of all bounded random variables to R with the property that ρ(X) = (F X ) for all X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P). Using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2, one can show that ρ inherits mixture-quasiconcavity from ρ 0 , which means that is quasiconcave. Select now any X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P) and recall from Remark 2 that the distribution of X can be expressed as the infinite convex combination F X (x) = 1 0 F X(·,u) du. Hence, we have
where the first inequality follows from the quasiconcavity of , while the second inequality holds because X(·, u) ∈ X 0 for all u ∈ [0, 1]. As the risk of any X ∈ X is bounded below by the optimal value of (3), the claim follows. From Remark 2 and Definition 7 it is clear that ρ 0 is randomization-proof if it is mixturequasiconcave and randomization-receptive otherwise.
Remark 3. Randomization-receptiveness is closely related to but distinct from the axiom of uncertainty aversion in maximin expected utility theory [21] . Translated into our context, uncertainty aversion (as initially introduced in [44] ) would require that the unique law invariant extension ρ
that mixing two equally risky positions cannot increase the risk. It appears that this axiom has not been adopted in the context of risk measures. Indeed, some of the most popular risk measures, such as the conditional value-at-risk, are in conflict with this axiom, see Example 4 (iii) below.
The results of this section require the probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) to be non-atomic. This assumption implies that every distribution function F ∈ D is adopted by some random variable X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ). It also means that any law invariant risk measure ρ 0 on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) corresponds to a functional 0 defined on the entire set D. In contrast, the random variables on an atomic probability space cannot adopt all distribution functions in D. For instance, continuous distribution functions are out of reach. Thus, the functional 0 corresponding to a law invariant risk measure ρ 0 on an atomic probability space is defined only on a subset of D.
We emphasize that many decision problems under uncertainty are naturally formulated on an atomic probability space (e.g., with finitely many outcomes). The ideas of this paper extend to this setting if the original probability space is augmented to a non-atomic one by introducing a continuously distributed dummy random variable. However, the sole role of this dummy random variable is to ensure that 0 is defined on all of D. Thus, introducing the dummy random variable is tantamount to prescribing a procedure for evaluating 0 on all possible distribution functions-even those that never emerge in the decision problem over pure strategies. Fortunately, all commonly used law invariant risk measures are readily defined on all of D. Thus, in practice there is no need to introduce dummy random variables even when dealing with atomic probability spaces.
Randomization-Receptive Risk Measures
We now identify four classes of randomization-receptive risk measures. All of these risk measures are law invariant, translation invariant and convex, but some are not monotonic and/or scale invariant.
Mean Moment of Order p. The order-p mean moment risk measure ρ 0 (X) = E P 0 [−X] + αE P 0 |E P 0 [X] − X| p with p ≥ 1 and α > 0 is law invariant, translation invariant and convex, but it fails to be monotonic or scale invariant in general.
We will show in Section 5.4 that order-2 mean moment (i.e., mean variance) risk measures are randomization-proof. For every other p ≥ 1 and any α > 0, however, these risk measures are randomization-receptive. Indeed, consider the following two random variables:
For p = 4 and α = 1, we obtain ρ(X) = 1, ρ(Y ) = 0.997 and ρ(X⊕ 1/2 Y ) = 0.934, that is,
Indeed, we have the following general result.
Theorem 4. The order-p mean moment risk measure ρ 0 (X) = E P 0 [−X] + αE P 0 |E P 0 [X] − X| p is randomization-receptive for every order p ∈ [1, 2) ∪ (2, ∞) and for any weighting α > 0.
We relegate the proof of Theorem 4 to the appendix. The above example (5) with p = 4 and α = 1 follows the construction proposed in that proof if we fix = 0.238.
Mean Deviation of Order p. The order-p mean deviation risk measure ρ 0 ( We will show in Section 5.4 that order-2 mean deviation risk measures are randomization-proof.
For every other p and any α > 0, however, these risk measures are randomization-receptive. To see this, consider the following two random variables:
For p = 4 and α = 1, we obtain ρ(X) = 1, ρ(Y ) = 1.001 and ρ(X⊕ 1/2 Y ) = 0.992, which implies
Indeed, we have the following general result. The proof of Theorem 5 can be found in the appendix. The above example (6) with p = 4 and α = 1 follows the construction proposed in that proof if we fix = 0.146.
Mean Semi-Moment of Order p. The order-p mean semi-moment risk measure ρ 0 (X) =
− X] p + with p ≥ 1 and α > 0 is law invariant, translation invariant and convex, but it is neither monotonic nor scale invariant in general. For p = 2, it reduces to the mean semi-variance risk measure, which we have shown to be randomization-receptive in Example 1.
Order-p mean semi-moment risk measures are randomization-receptive for every p > 1 and any α > 0. To see this, consider the following two random variables:
For p = 2 and α = 1, we obtain ρ(X) = 1, ρ(Y ) = 0.998 and ρ(X⊕ 1/2 Y ) = 0.833, which implies that ρ(X⊕ 1/2 Y ) < min{ρ(X), ρ(Y )}. Indeed, we have the following general result.
Theorem 6. The order-p mean semi-moment risk measure ρ 0 (
is randomization-receptive for every order p ≥ 1 and for any weighting α > 0.
The proof of Theorem 6 is relegated to the appendix. The above example (7) with p = 2 and α = 1 follows the construction proposed in that proof if we fix = 0.999.
Mean Semi-Deviation of Order p. The order-p mean semi-deviation risk measure ρ 0 (X) = Order-p mean semi-deviation risk measures are randomization-receptive for every p > 1 and any α > 0. To see this, consider the following two random variables:
For p = 2 and α = 1, we obtain ρ(X) = 1, ρ(Y ) = 1.029 and ρ(X⊕ 1/2 Y ) = 0.990, which implies that ρ(X⊕ 1/2 Y ) < min{ρ(X), ρ(Y )}. Indeed, we have the following general result. The proof of Theorem 7 can be found in the appendix. The above example (8) with p = 2 and α = 1 follows the construction proposed in that proof if we fix = 0.581.
Randomization-Proof Risk Measures
We now present commonly used law invariant risk measures that are randomization-proof. Specifically, we discuss spectral risk measures in Section 5.1, divergence risk measures in Section 5.2 and shortfall risk measures in Section 5.3. Other randomization-proof risk measures that fit into none of these categories are discussed in Section 5.4.
Spectral Risk Measures
Spectral risk measures 3 can be defined axiomatically as convex law invariant monetary risk measures that are also comonotonic. The latter property captures the intuitive idea that if two positions X and Y are comonotone, then X cannot serve as a hedge for Y , and thus the risks of X and Y should add up.
called spectral if it is convex and law invariant and satisfies the following condition for all X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Lemma 2. For convex risk measures, comonotonicity implies scale invariance.
Proof. Let ρ 0 : L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) → R be a comonotonic convex risk measure. Note first that ρ 0 (0) = ρ 0 (0 + 0) = 2ρ 0 (0) by comonotonicity. Thus, we find ρ 0 (0) = 0. Moreover, for any i ∈ N we find (i) Expected loss: ρ 0 (X) = E P 0 [−X] = − Ω 0 X(ω 0 ) P 0 (dω 0 ). Note that the expected value is additive for all pairs and, in particular, for all pairs of comonotone random variables.
(ii) Essential supremum: ρ 0 (X) = ess sup(−X) = inf s∈R {s : P 0 (−X ≤ s) = 1}.
(iii) Conditional value-at-risk: ρ 0 (X) = CV@R α (X) = inf s∈R s+ 1 1−α E P 0 [−X −s] + with α ∈ [0, 1). Note that the conditional value-at-risk reduces to the expected value for α = 0 and to the essential supremum for α ↑ 1. Thus, it is common to define CV@R 1 (X) = ess sup(−X). 4 (iv) Mixture of conditional value-at-risk: ρ 0 (X) = 1 0 CV@R α (X) µ(dα) with µ a Borel probability measure on [0, 1]. In fact, every spectral risk measure can be represented as a mixture of conditional value-at-risk [32] .
Proof. Select any X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), and denote by F −1 X and F −1 Y their respective quantile functions. As (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic, there exists a standard uniformly distributed random variable U 0 ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), which we use to define the random variables X = F −1 X (U 0 ) and Y = F −1 Y (U 0 ). By construction, X and Y have the same distributions as X and Y , respectively. As distribution and quantile functions are non-decreasing, we find that X (ω 0 ) ≥ X (ω 0 ) is equivalent
and Y are comonotone. Next, choose any θ ∈ [0, 1]. Remark 2 implies that X⊕ θ Y and X ⊕ θ Y share the same distribution. If ρ is the unique law invariant extension of ρ 0 , then
= min(ρ(X), ρ(Y )) (by law invariance).
The second equality in the above derivation holds because ρ inherits comonotonicity from ρ 0 . Thus, ρ 0 is randomization-proof.
As we have seen in Section 4, the mean semi-deviation is randomization-receptive despite being coherent and law invariant. This is only possible because it is not comonotonic. 4 The conditional value-at-risk can even strictly discourage randomization. To see this, set X = −1 and assume that the random variable Y takes the values 0 and −2 with probabilities 0.75 and 0.25, respectively. In this case, we have CV@R 50% (X⊕ 1/2 Y ) = 1.25 even though CV@R 50% (X) = CV@R 50% (Y ) = 1.
Divergence Risk Measures
The divergence risk of a position X is defined as the worst-case expectation of the corresponding loss −X across all probability measures Q that are absolutely continuous with respect to P 0 , where any Q = P 0 is assigned a divergence penalty. 
is the ϕ-divergence of the probability measure Q with respect to P 0 , while Q P 0 indicates that Q admits a Radon-Nikodym derivative dQ dP 0 with respect to P 0 .
It follows directly from their definition that divergence risk measures are monetary and convex.
The following theorem offers an intuitive physical interpretation of divergence risk measures. which quantifies the expected utility of an optimized payment schedule that splits an uncertain future revenue X into an amount s that is paid today and a remainder X − s that is paid after the uncertainty has been revealed. By Theorem 9, the divergence risk measure induced by ϕ thus coincides with the negative optimized certainty equivalent corresponding to the utility function u.
Example 5 (Divergence Risk Measures). Examples of divergence risk measures are listed below.
(i) Expected value: ρ 0 (X) = E P 0 [−X] is obtained by setting ϕ(t) = 0, that is, u(s) = s.
(ii) Conditional value-at-risk: ρ 0 (X) = CV@R α (X) for α ∈ [0, 1) is obtained by setting ϕ(t) = 0 if 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 1−α and ϕ(t) = ∞ else, which corresponds to u(s) = 1 1−α min{s, 0}.
(iii) Entropic risk measure:
The example of the entropic risk measure indicates that divergence risk measures are not necessarily scale invariant and may thus fail to be coherent, see also [7, Theorem 3.1] .
Proof. Select any X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) and θ ∈ [0, 1], and denote by ρ the unique law invariant extension of ρ 0 . Then, we have
where the first equality follows from Theorem 9, and the second equality holds due to Remark 2.
The two inequalities follow from the superadditivity of the infimum operator and the fact that θ ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Thus, ρ 0 is randomization-proof.
Shortfall Risk Measures
The shortfall risk of a position X is the smallest cash amount that must be added to X in order to lift the expected utility of X above a prescribed threshold or acceptability level. The shortfall risk measures belong to the class of elicitable risk measures [5] , which encompasses also non-convex risk measures such as the value-at-risk. All elicitable and-a fortiori-all shortfall risk measures exhibit favorable statistical properties and thus lend themselves to historical backtesting [5] . We now establish that shortfall risk measures are randomization-proof.
Proof. Select any X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) and θ ∈ [0, 1], and denote by ρ the unique law invariant extension of ρ 0 to (Ω, F, P). Then, we have
where the second equality is due to Remark 2, and the inequality holds because for every s feasible in the second line either s X = s is feasible in the first minimization problem or s Y = s is feasible in the second minimization problem in the third line. Thus, the claim follows.
Other Randomization-Proof Risk Measures
Below we survey several popular law invariant risk measures that are randomization-proof but do not fit into any of the categories considered so far.
Value-at-Risk. The value-at-risk ρ 0 (X) = inf {x ∈ R : P 0 (X ≤ −x) ≥ α} at level α ∈ [0, 1] is a monetary risk measure but fails to be convex [19, Example 4.11] . Note that it is reminiscent of a shortfall risk measure with a non-concave utility function. To show that the value-at-risk is randomization-proof, one can thus use similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 11. Details are omitted for brevity of exposition.
Mean Variance. The mean variance or Markowitz risk measure ρ 0 (X) = E P 0 [−X]+αE P 0 [E P 0 [X]− X] 2 with α > 0 is convex and translation invariant but fails to be monotonic and scale invariant [45, Example 6.18] . It is well-known that the mean variance risk measure can be reformulated can be reformulated as ρ 0 (X) = E P 0 [−X] + inf t∈R αE P 0 [max{ (X − t), (1 − )(t − X)}]. From this representation we conclude that ρ 0 is mixture-concave and thus randomization-proof.
Negative Sharpe Ratio. The negative Sharpe ratio or signal-to-noise ratio ρ 0 (X) = −(
fails to be monotonic, translation invariant, convex and scale invariant but enjoys quasiconvexity in X. To prove that ρ 0 is mixture-quasiconcave, it suffices to show that the set of all distribution functions F X corresponding to random variables satisfying E P 0 [X] ≥ τ and ρ 0 (X) ≥ β is convex for every β ∈ R. This holds, however, because the feasible set of the constraint
is convex in F X whenever β ≤ 0 and collapses to the (convex) singleton set {F τ } for β > 0, where F τ is the Dirac distribution that places unit mass on τ . Our argument implies that ρ 0 is mixture-quasiconcave and thus randomization-proof.
Randomization under Distributional Ambiguity
In many decision-making situations the probability measure P 0 governing all relevant random variables is itself uncertain. Indeed, P 0 must usually be estimated from limited statistical data or guessed on the basis of expert judgment, and therefore one can typically only guarantee that P 0 belongs to a (nonempty) family P 0 of distributions that share certain structural or statistical properties. We will henceforth refer to P 0 as the ambiguity set.
In order to reason formally about decision problems under distributional ambiguity, we introduce the notion of an ambiguous probability space (Ω, F 0 , P 0 ), i.e., a measurable space (Ω, F 0 ) endowed with an ambiguity set P 0 . Let L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) = ∩ P∈P 0 L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P) be the space of all random variables that are essentially bounded with respect to every probability measure in the ambiguity set, and note that any X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) can have multiple distribution functions. Below, we denote by F P X the distribution function of X under the probability measure P ∈ P 0 . We can then construct the ambiguity set of all possible distributions of X as {F P X : P ∈ P 0 }. Throughout this section we will assume that the ambiguous probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic.
Definition 12 (Non-Atomic Ambiguous Probability Space). The ambiguous probability space (Ω, F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic if there exists a random variable U 0 ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) that follows a standard uniform distribution under every probability measure P ∈ P 0 .
Definition 12 can always be enforced by introducing a dummy random variable that is known to follow the standard uniform distribution, and it implies that L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is rich enough to contain-modulo law invariance-all bounded random variables with an unambiguous distribution.
Lemma 3 (Richness of L ∞ (Ω, F, P 0 )). If (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic, then for every F ∈ D there exists X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) with F P X = F for all P ∈ P 0 .
Proof. The proof closely parallels that of Lemma 1 and is thus omitted.
The definition of monetary risk measures naturally extends to ambiguous probability spaces if we require X ≥ Y P-almost surely for every P ∈ P in the antecedent of the monotonicity condition.
The definitions of convex and coherent risk measures also directly extend to ambiguous probability spaces. However, the notion of law invariance has to be reconciled in the presence of ambiguity.
Definition 13 (Law Invariance Revisited). A risk measure ρ 0 : L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) → R is called law invariant if it satisfies the following condition for all X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Note that Definition 13 reduces to Definition 2 for the singleton ambiguity set P = {P 0 }. We can now show that for any law invariant risk measure ρ 0 on a non-atomic ambiguous probability space there is a real-valued functional 0 on the set D of all distribution functions with bounded support such that ρ 0 (X) = 0 (F X ) for each random variable X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) with an unambiguous distribution function F X .
Proposition 3 (Existence and Uniqueness of 0 ). If (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic and ρ 0 is a law invariant risk measure on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), then there is a unique functional 0 on D such that for all F ∈ D, we have
Proof. The proof widely parallels that of Proposition 1, i.e., the mapping 0 exists because ρ 0 is law invariant, and it is unique because (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic. Details are omitted for brevity.
By definition, 0 is constructed from ρ 0 . But it is not possible to reconstruct ρ 0 from 0 because 0 only contains information on the restriction of ρ 0 to the space of unambiguous random variables.
A unique backtransformation exists, however, if ρ 0 constitutes an ambiguity averse risk measure.
Definition 14 (Ambiguity Averse Risk Measure). A risk measure ρ 0 : L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) → R is called ambiguity averse if it satisfies the following conditions for all X, Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ):
Ambiguity aversion: If {F P X : P ∈ P 0 } ⊆ {F P Y : P ∈ P 0 }, then ρ 0 (X) ≤ ρ 0 (Y ).
Ambiguity monotonicity: If 0 (F P X ) ≤ 0 (F P Y ) for all P ∈ P 0 , then ρ 0 (X) ≤ ρ 0 (Y ).
Ambiguity aversion implies law invariance in the sense of Definition 13. Thus, Proposition 3
ensures that the functional 0 in the ambiguity monotonicity condition is well-defined. Ambiguity aversion states that X is weakly preferred to Y if the distribution of X is less ambiguous than that of Y with respect to the partial order induced by set inclusion. It captures the empirical observation that many decision makers display a very low tolerance for ambiguity and is in line with the current thinking in distributionally robust optimization, where one seeks decisions that are worst-case optimal with respect to all distributions in a prescribed ambiguity set [14, 22, 49] .
Ambiguity monotonicity states that X is weakly preferred to Y under an ambiguous probability measure if X is weakly preferred to Y under each fixed probability measure in the given ambiguity set. Ambiguity monotonicity is reminiscent of the classical monotonicity axiom from Definition 4.
We note that there are ambiguity monotone risk measures that violate the monotonicity axiom from Definition 4. Thus, ambiguity monotonicity does not imply classical monotonicity in general.
Theorem 12 (Reconstructing ρ 0 from 0 ). If (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic and ρ 0 represents an ambiguity averse monetary risk measure on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), then ρ 0 (X) = sup P∈P 0 0 (F P X ).
Proof. The proof proceeds in two steps. First we exploit ambiguity aversion to argue that ρ 0 (X) ≥ sup P∈P 0 0 (F P X ), and then we use ambiguity monotonicity to show that ρ 0 (X) ≤ sup P∈P 0 0 (F P X ).
Step 1: Select X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) and Q ∈ P 0 , and denote by F Q X ∈ D the distribution function of X under Q. By Lemma 3, there exists a random variable Y ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) with F P Y = F Q X for every P ∈ P 0 . This means that {F P Y : P ∈ P 0 } = {F Q X } ⊆ {F P X : P ∈ P 0 }, which in turn implies that ρ 0 (X) ≥ ρ 0 (Y ) = 0 (F Q X ), where the inequality follows from the ambiguity aversion of ρ 0 , while the equality holds due to the definition of 0 and because Y is unambiguous. As the choice of X and Q was arbitrary, we may conclude that ρ 0 (X) ≥ sup Q∈P 0 0 (F Q X ) for every X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ).
Step 2: Select again X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) and set s = sup P∈P 0 0 (F P X ). By using translation invariance twice, which holds because ρ 0 is monetary, the degenerate random variable Y = ρ 0 (s) can be shown to satisfy
Thus, we find 0 (F P Y ) = ρ 0 (Y ) = s ≥ 0 (F P X ) for all P ∈ P 0 , where the first equality holds due to the definition of 0 and because Y is unambiguous, and the inequality follows from the definition of s. Hence, X is weakly preferred to Y under each fixed probability measure in the ambiguity set.
By ambiguity monotonicity, we thus have ρ 0 (X) ≤ ρ 0 (Y ) = s = sup P∈P 0 0 (F P X ). [20, 40, 51, 52] .
Let us now contemplate decision problems of the form (3), where ρ 0 represents an ambiguity averse monetary risk measure, while X 0 constitutes a subset of L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ). As in Section 3, our main goal is to identify situations in which the optimal value of (3) can be strictly improved by allowing for randomized strategies. Thus, we introduce a randomization device generating standard uniformly distributed samples that are independent of all random variables in L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) under every probability measure in P 0 . Formally, we augment the ambiguous probability space It remains to be shown that ρ 0 can be uniquely extended to an ambiguity averse monetary risk measure ρ on (Ω, F, P) that coincides with ρ 0 on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ).
Proposition 4 (Ambiguity Averse Extension). If (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic and ρ 0 is an ambiguity averse monetary risk measure on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ), then the unique extension of ρ 0 to an ambiguity averse monetary risk measure ρ on L ∞ (Ω, F, P) is given by ρ(X) = sup P∈P 0 (F P X ).
Proof. Let ρ be any ambiguity averse risk measure that extends ρ 0 to L ∞ (Ω, F, P), and note that (Ω, F, P) is non-atomic as an extension of a non-atomic ambiguous probability space. Proposition 3 and Theorem 12 thus ensure the existence of a mapping : D → R with ρ(X) = sup P∈P (F P X ) for all X ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P). Hence, if X ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) with F P X = F Q X = F X for all P, Q ∈ P, then
where the first and the fifth equalities hold because X is unambiguous, the second and the fourth equalities follow from the definitions of and 0 , respectively, and the third equality holds because ρ must equal ρ 0 on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ). Lemma 3 then implies that (F ) = 0 (F ) for all F ∈ D. Thus, ρ(X) = sup P∈P 0 (F P X ) is the only ambiguity averse risk measure extending ρ 0 to L ∞ (Ω, F, P).
By an immediate extension of Theorem 2, one can prove that there is no benefit in adopting a randomized strategy when minimizing a convex ambiguity averse monetary risk measure over a convex set X 0 . In stark contrast to Section 3, however, there is no ambiguity averse monetary risk measure that induces a dispreference for randomization irrespective of X 0 . Indeed, under mild regularity conditions, one can show that for any ambiguity averse monetary risk measure there exists a decision problem (with a nonconvex feasible set) in which a randomized strategy strictly dominates all pure strategies. We will first motivate this statement through an example and then provide a formal proof.
Example 7 (The Rainbow Urn Game). An urn contains balls of K different colors (e.g., red, orange, yellow, . . . , indigo, violet), but the number of balls and the proportions of the colors are unknown. A player is asked to name a color and to draw a random ball from the urn. If the chosen ball has the stated color, the player pays a penalty of $1. Otherwise, there is a reward of $1. As the distribution of colors is completely ambiguous, the worst scenario for a player selecting color k is that all balls in the urn are painted in color k, in which case the penalty of $1 arises with certainty. An ambiguity averse player restricting attention to pure strategies is thus indifferent between participating in the game and paying a fixed amount of $1. If the player were to select one of the K pure strategies uniformly at random (e.g., by rolling a fair K-sided die), however, the ambiguity could be completely suppressed. Specifically, the player would face a reward of $1 with probability K−1 K and a penalty of $1 with probability 1 K . Under the vast majority of commonly used risk measures, 6 this option is asymptotically (i.e., for large K) as attractive as receiving a certain reward of $1.
In order to facilitate a rigorous treatment of the rainbow urn game, we have to introduce the notion of a maximally ambiguous random variable.
Definition 15 (Maximally Ambiguous Random Variable). We say that V ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is maximally ambiguous if it can have any bounded distribution, that is, if {F P V : P ∈ P 0 } = D.
We will also focus on ambiguity averse monetary risk measures satisfying the Lebesgue property.
In order to define the Lebesgue property, recall that a sequence of distribution functions F k ∈ D,
Definition 16 (Lebesgue Property). An ambiguity averse monetary risk measure representable as ρ 0 (X) = sup P∈P 0 0 (F P X ) is said to satisfy the Lebesgue property if lim k↑∞ 0 (F k ) = 0 (F ) whenever F k converges weakly to F .
Definition 16 generalizes the original definition of the Lebesgue property in [26] to ambiguous probability spaces. Apart from the essential supremum in Example 4, all risk measures studied in this paper satisfy the Lebesgue property. We are now armed to state the main result of this section.
Theorem 13 (Power of Randomization). Assume that (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) is non-atomic, there is a maximally ambiguous random variable V ∈ L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) and ρ 0 constitutes an ambiguity averse monetary risk measure on L ∞ (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ) satisfying the Lebesgue property. Then, there exists a (nonconvex) feasible set X 0 such that the optimal value of (4) is strictly smaller than that of (3).
Proof. The presence of a maximally ambiguous random variable V allows us to model the rainbow urn game portrayed in Example 7 on the basis of the ambiguous probability space (Ω 0 , F 0 , P 0 ).
Specifically, the reward associated with the pure action "name color k" can be represented by the random variable X k = 1 − 2 1 {(k−1)/K≤W <k/K} (for k < K) or X k = 1 − 2 1 {(K−1)/K≤W ≤1} (for k = K), with W = V mod 1. The distribution function of X k under P ∈ P 0 is thus given by
for k = K. As V is maximally ambiguous, there exists P k ∈ P 0 with W = V = k−1 K P k -almost surely. Thus, X k = −1 P k -almost surely, implying that the distribution function of X k under P k
for all x ∈ R and for all P ∈ P 0 , that is, F P k X k first order stochastically dominates every other distribution function F P X k , P ∈ P 0 . Thus, the risk of the pure strategy X k can be expressed as
where the first equality is due to Theorem 12, the second equality holds because any law invariant convex risk measure on a non-atomic probability space is monotonic with respect to first-order stochastic dominance [4, Theorem 4.2] , and the last equality exploits again Theorem 12 and the fact that F P k X k coincides with the distribution function of the degenerate constant random variable −1. The optimal value of problem (3) over X 0 = {X k : k = 1, . . . , K} is thus given by ρ 0 (−1).
Next, we construct the optimization problem (4) over randomized strategies in the usual manner, and we exploit the presence of a randomization device to define a random variable U ∈ L ∞ (Ω, F, P)
with U (ω 0 , u) = u for all (ω 0 , u) ∈ Ω. By construction, U is unambiguous and follows the standard uniform distribution irrespective of P ∈ P. The reward associated with the randomized action "name any color k with probability 1 K " can thus be represented through the random variable
Using a similar reasoning as in Example 2, one can further demonstrate that the distribution function of the randomized strategy X 1:K coincides with the equally weighted convex combination of the distribution functions of all pure strategies X k , that is,
where the second equality follows from the observation that
irrespective of P ∈ P. Thus, as the number K of colors tends to infinity, F P X 1:K converges weakly to F ∈ D defined through F (x) = 0 if x < 1; = 1 if x ≥ 1. For any fixed Q ∈ P we then find lim K↑∞ ρ(X 1:K ) = lim K↑∞ sup P∈P 0 (F P X 1:K ) = lim K↑∞ 0 (F Q X 1:K ) = 0 (F ) = ρ(1),
where the first equality follows from Proposition 4, the second equality holds because F P X 1:K is constant across all P ∈ P, and the third equality follows from the Lebesgue property of ρ 0 . The last equality exploits again Proposition 4 and the fact that F coincides with the distribution function of the degenerate constant random variable 1. By translation invariance, the optimal value of problem (4) thus converges to ρ(1) = ρ 0 (−1) − 2 as K grows. Hence, for sufficiently large K there is a randomized strategy whose risk is strictly smaller than the risk of the best pure strategy.
Theorem 13 suggests that ambiguity averse decision makers solving problem (3) instead of (4) may unwittingly expose themselves to avoidable risks and thus act irrationally. Furthermore, it indicates that various recent distributionally robust optimization problems involving discrete choices such as appointment scheduling [37] , knapsack [12] , hospital admission [36] , shortest path [13] , unit commitment [25] , facility location [11] , and vehicle routing problems [23] etc. might benefit from randomization.
A Remark about Time Consistency
Consider again Example 1 from Section 1, where the attractiveness of a project was assessed via the mean semi-variance of its uncertain NPV. We have seen that if exactly one out of the five projects specified in Table 1 can be chosen, then it is optimal to randomly select projects 1 and 5 with probabilities 63% and 37%, respectively, which results in a mean semi-variance of −0.0540.
Upon further reflection one realizes that, by allowing for randomized strategies, the single-stage project selection problem has essentially been transformed to a two-stage problem. Indeed, the succession of events is as follows. First, the manager selects a decision rule or contingency plan that assigns each possible outcome u ∈ [0, 1] of the randomization device a project to be chosen upon observation of u. Then, "the dice are rolled" and a particular outcome u is observed. Finally, the project associated with outcome u is implemented. Only then the outcome ω 0 associated with the exogenous uncertainty is observed, and the corresponding NPV is realized.
An optimal strategy for this two-stage problem is to select project 1 if u ≤ 63% and project 5 if u > 63%. Unfortunately, this strategy suffers from a time inconsistency and may therefore not be implemented. Indeed, after observing u, the manager could follow the recommendation of the randomization device and implement project 1 or project 5, which would result in a mean semi-variance of 0.1500 in either case. Instead, she could implement project 3, which would result in a lower mean semi-variance of 0.0500; see Table 1 . Thus, as soon as the outcome of the randomization device is known (and there is no possibility to roll the dice for a second time), there is an incentive to deviate from the optimal randomized strategy and to select the optimal pure strategy instead.
This phenomenon is not unique to the project selection example or the use of the mean semivariance risk measure. Indeed, randomized strategies suffer from a form of time-inconsistency. A possible remedy is to utilize a commitment device, that is, a means with which the manager locks herself into the course of action prescribed by the optimal strategy. For example, the manager might settle for selecting a randomized strategy but outsource the implementation of this policy to a third party. Alternatively, she could enforce the implementation of the optimal strategy contractually by agreeing to pay high penalties for any deviations from this strategy. Yet another possibility for the manager would be to publicize the optimal strategy upfront, thus putting her reputation at stake. Some decision makers might feel that the time inconsistency phenomenon outlined above is unacceptable and that any decision criteria susceptible to randomization should therefore be rejected as inappropriate. While we would not argue against such a position, we highlight again that many randomization-receptive risk measures (both classical and ambiguity averse) are used routinely in academia and practice. When such risk measures are employed, it is a mathematical fact that decision makers who neglect randomized strategies might sacrifice performance.
Conclusion
In this paper we investigated whether randomized strategies can strictly outperform the best deterministic strategy in stochastic and distributionally robust optimization problems that involve (worst-case) risk measures. We confirmed that randomization does not help in many common settings, such as in optimization problems that are convex or that minimize spectral, divergence or shortfall risk measures. Interestingly, however, the optimality of deterministic strategies is not a direct consequence of the axioms of law invariant and coherent risk measures (see, e.g., the mean semi-deviation measure in Section 4), and it is not tenable in a distributionally robust setting. This is in sharp contrast to the expected utility framework commonly adopted in economics, where the optimality of deterministic strategies directly follows from the independence axiom.
Our results provide a justification for the common practice of focusing on deterministic strategies in stochastic programming whenever the employed risk measure is randomization-proof. On the other hand, our results indicate that randomized decisions may be beneficial in several classes of recently studied distributionally robust optimization problems, such as project management, appointment scheduling, vehicle routing and supply chain design problems. We thus identify the design of tractable algorithms for optimizing over randomized strategies as a fruitful area for future research. Finally, we believe that the issue of time consistency in randomized strategies merits further investigation.
